A scenario in which regulators take the drastic step of requiring coverage of all venture bank investment loans using interbank borrowed funds is considered. In this scenario, a minimal amount of default insurance is used, such that Tier 1 and 2 capital requirements are still met. To do this, the default insurance percentage on all investment loans is cut to 3.88%, although the minimum is 2.88%.
Introduction
The Default Insurance Note (DIN) based banking Venture Banking system has already been laid out (Hanley, 2017a (Hanley, , 2017b . To fully understand this discussion, it is necessary to understand the venture bank system as proposed in those papers, with the core of it contained in the former.
In brief, this system is based on the fundamental algorithm where:
A. A bank issues a loan to a borrower.

B. The bank purchases a derivative to act as insurance against default on the loan.
C. The bank then books this insured valuation of the loan into its capital account.
This allows the bank to issue a new loan up to the amount of the insurance policy (Hanley, 2012) . Herein I will discuss the impact of what I would consider a regulatory failure, or perhaps better termed, sabotage of the Venture Banking system. I do not think that a properly run venture banking system will increase risk, I think it will lower it. Therefore, I do not believe that regulators should change regulations to force coverage of insured loan assets with borrowed interbank funds. However, not all regulatory moves are done for the benefit of the system. It is conceivable that some entity could lobby to essentially force double-coverage of the DIN backed loan assets in order to make a short term profit.
2 Impact of double-coverage of insured assets with short-term funds
Overview
What would happen in this scenario is that regulators would force a venture bank to cover its insured asset loans. To do that, the venture bank would need to borrow on the open market. To model the impact of this, cost is based on records of the London interbank offered rate. (FRED 2016) .
The modeling results shown below are made assuming long-term (e.g. lifetime of the venturebank) in order to be conservative. However, I do not think that such a regulatory move would occur for a long time, it should be a short-term event that may last 6-24 months. Again, I do not think this is a valid regulatory decision. However, the question came up, so I modeled it to see if the venture-bank system could survive with such a burden. It can, but under tight limits.
Interest rate data source -LIBOR
Looking back to 1986, the median and mean LIBOR were 4.26% and 4.58% respectively, which would yield funds borrowing rates of 4.51% and 4.83% in this model. These data are used in modeling of the LIBOR dependent version. LIBOR -(1986 LIBOR -( -2016 LIBOR -( ) 30 year median 4.26%, mean 4.58%. (1996 LIBOR -( -2016 LIBOR -( ) 20 year median 2.44%, mean 3.10%. (2006 LIBOR -( -2016 10 year median 1.06%, mean 1.94%
Net return data source -Kauffman's set of 99 venture capital firms
Each bar in figure 2 is return for one of the 99 venture capital firms, net of VC firm's 2% fee and 20% carry. My model uses a compressed version of this with the same overall characteristics obtained by averaging pairs. By adding and subtracting from this compressed dataset, varying rates of return are modeled, all with the same overall spread as Kauffman's dataset.
DIN coverage for risk mitigation of interbank lenders
DIN coverage is the percentage of each investment in a loan portfolio that is covered by a DIN. This would be determined by two primary factors as mentioned in section 2 above: First, that a venture bank must maintain a sufficient level of insurance on its portfolio that collapse of part of its portfolio will not leave it scrambling to meet Tier 1 and Tier 2 reserve requirements. Second, that a venture bank must also maintain a sufficient level of insurance to ensure that interbank lenders are able to provide preferred loan rates without undue systemic risk. It is this latter requirement that is likely to set the minimum level of DIN coverage at between 1 and 2 multiples of the 2.88% floor.
Calculation of DIN coverage levels to mitigate risk of interbank lenders
I used the historical Kauffman data shown in figure 2 , and approached the problem in two ways. For the first method, I used a cutoff based on standard deviation. The Kauffman data has a standard deviation of 1.116 over 99 venture funds. To generate a conservative number, I reset all data points more than one standard deviation above break-even to the break-even value of 1 (one). This generated a net loss on the total portfolio of 2.72%. This projects a minimum DIN coverage rate of 5.6%, obtained by summing the 2.88% required for reserves maintenance, and 2.72% needed for interbank lenders.
Using this value shifts venture-bank profitability down somewhat. At a 2% inter-bank funds rate, the For the second method, I set all of the portfolio returns above the break-even value of 1 (one) to breakeven (e.g. 1). This generated a highly conservative loss projection. Using this method, the net portfolio loss was 17.45%. Summing 2.88% and 17.45% generates a ceiling of 20.33% DIN coverage.
This level of DIN coverage will only work with a rate of return of 1.47X or higher at the 30X MOC level. I doubt this would allow the venture-bank business as a whole to survive.
The actual decisions on DIN coverage would be up to the interbank lenders. However, it should be possible to see how I chose the value of 3.88% DIN coverage as reasonable. Certainly for established parties that can show history, given the interesting conclusion that past performance had significance predicting future results in venture capital (Mulcahy, 2012) , 3.88% should provide adequate coverage for both requirements.
Portfolio models with 1.82% LIBOR funds rate, 3.88% DIN coverage and 5% DIN premiums
Model results below are using a 1 year bank rate of 1.82%, for three different portfolios, high (1.50 return), medium (1.31 return) and low (1.04 return). Current 12 month LIBOR is 1.57%, so the bank rate is set at LIBOR + 0.25%. These three portfolios have 1.50, 1.31 and 1.10 net returns when operated conventionally.
DIN coverage is set at 3.88% of each investment. This level is 1.347 times the minimum that is required to meet tier capitalization requirements, and is chosen as a conservative value to ensure a venture bank doesn't have a reserves crisis in case of failure of investments. It is also chosen as a level that I believe should be sufficient for most venture banks in order to secure preferred interbank loan rates.
In this 10 year to exit model, the DIN rate is fixed at 5%, and pay-off year is set at year 5. After paying off on a DIN, there is no more premium income and the bank rate is used to determine the cost of money to carry the pay-off amounts for the next 5 years.
Note that in these models I keep a conservative margin on the maximum capital, calling out the 30X and 43X multiples of capital. Portfolio sensitivity to LIBOR with 3.88% of invested funds covered by DIN 
Concluding remarks
The impact of a long-term requirement have double-coverage of DIN insured loans would be severe on the venture banks. Except when LIBOR rates are at historical minima, in the long-term venture banks would be underwater if their returns were less than 1.3 or so. (Fig. 3 ) Underwriters, on the other hand, should make money, as long as their venture-bank clients didn't go under. (Fig. 4) However, should regulators take what is essentially a deliberately destructive stance, most likely it would not persist over the long-term. And if it did, the response could be to transfer the assets to a bank in another jurisdiction.
This regulatory decision would dramatically lower the stability and profitability of venture banks and creates a link into the larger banking system. This creates systemic risk where none would exist when using default insurance alone, because default insurance backed capital assets are decoupled from the rest of the banking system.
